Privacy-aware secure anonymous communication protocol in CPSS cloud computing by Li, Fengyin et al.
Privacy-aware secure anonymous communication protocol in CPSS cloud computing









Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Link to publication in ResearchOnline
Citation for published version (Harvard):
Li, F, Cui, C, Wang, D, Liu, Z, Elmrabit, N, Wang, Y & Zhou, H 2020, 'Privacy-aware secure anonymous
communication protocol in CPSS cloud computing', IEEE Access, vol. 8, pp. 62660-62669.
https://doi.org/10.1109/ACCESS.2020.2982961
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please view our takedown policy at https://edshare.gcu.ac.uk/id/eprint/5179 for details
of how to contact us.
Download date: 12. Jun. 2020
SPECIAL SECTION ON CLOUD - FOG - EDGE COMPUTING IN
CYBER-PHYSICAL-SOCIAL SYSTEMS (CPSS)
Received February 18, 2020, accepted March 9, 2020, date of publication March 24, 2020, date of current version April 15, 2020.
Digital Object Identifier 10.1109/ACCESS.2020.2982961
Privacy-Aware Secure Anonymous
Communication Protocol in CPSS Cloud
Computing
FENGYIN LI1, CAN CUI2, DONGFENG WANG 1, ZHONGXING LIU1,
NEBRASE ELMRABIT3, YING WANG1, AND HUIYU ZHOU3
1School of Information Science and Engineering, Qufu Normal University, Rizhao 276826, China
2School of Cyber Science and Engineering, Shandong University of Political Science and Law, Jinan 250014, China
3School of Informatics, University of Leicester, Leicester LE1 7RH, U.K.
Corresponding author: Huiyu Zhou (hz143@leicester.ac.uk)
This work was supported in part by the EU Horizon 2020 DOMINOES Project under Grant771066.
ABSTRACT Cloud computing has emerged as a promising paradigm for the Internet of Things (IoT)
and Cyber-Physical-Social Systems (CPSS). However, the problem of how to ensure the security of data
transmission and data storage in CPSS is a key issue to address. We need to protect the confidentiality and
privacy of users’ data and users’ identity during the transmission and storage process in CPSS. In order
to avoid users’ personal information leakage from IoT devices during the process of data processing and
transmitting, we propose a certificateless encryption scheme, and conduct a security analysis under the
assumption of Computational Diffie-Hellman(CDH) Problem. Furthermore, based on the proposed cryp-
tography mechanism, we achieve a novel anonymous communication protocol to protect the identity privacy
of communicating units in CPSS. In the new protocol, an anonymous communication link establishment
method and an anonymous communication packet encapsulation format are proposed. The Diffie-Hellman
key exchange algorithm is used to construct the anonymous keys distribution method in the new link
establishment method. And in the new onion routing packet encapsulation format, the session data are
firstly separated from the authentication data to decrease the number of cryptography operations. That
is, by using the new onion routing packet we greatly reduces the encryption operations and promotes
the forwarding efficiency of anonymous messages, implementing the privacy, security and efficiency in
anonymous communication in cyber-physical-social systems.
INDEX TERMS Internet of Things, cloud computing, CPSS, privacy protection, anonymous communica-
tion.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cloud computing has emerged as a promising paradigm
for the Internet of Things (IoT) and Cyber-Physical-Social
Systems (CPSS) [1]. Cloud computing gives rise to research
challenges spanning from design and implementation of
mechanisms to trust and identity management in federated
environments [2]. A central challenge is the effective security
and privacy mechanism to assure the data confidentiality and
identity privacy during the communication between highly
distrusted mobile devices in CPSS.
IoT devices collect user data, transmit and store them on
the cloud server, for later data analysis, PublicLeaks-based
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and
approving it for publication was Xiaokang Wang.
criminal smart contracts can be used to protect private data
[3]. However, in most cases, user data collected by IoT
devices are transmitted and presented in the form of plaintext
in the network and the cloud servers, especially those sen-
sitive data in enterprise information system [4]. This causes
the collected user data to be maliciously modified or illegally
exploited. The attacker may extract confidential information
of the users from the exposed data.
How to protect the privacy of user data to assure the
rapid and secure network communication is one of the key
issues to be solved in public communication environments.
Criminal smart contracts were used to prevent criminals’
illegal behaviors [5]. Locality-Sensitive Hashing (LSH) were
used to provide privacy-preserving and scalable mobile ser-
vice recommendation [6]. In the next generation of Internet
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architectures, security has become part of the network archi-
tecture, rather than being achieved through additional net-
works layers on the existing Internet [7], [8]. In the next
generation network architecture, anonymous communication
privacy protection is implemented by encrypting the address
data which representing the user’s identity [9]. The entire
data packet of the user is securely forwarded anonymously
through the anonymous communication link, ensuring the
identity privacy of the users [10], [11]. The user identity
is not visible. However, because the network device needs
to know some information about the user to route and for-
ward message, users’ identity cannot be completely hidden in
many kinds of applications [12]–[15]. Therefore, anonymous
communication hides important information from untrusted
parties and discloses necessary information to the licen-
sor or trusted party. By using an encryption technology,
anonymous communication hides the user’s personal infor-
mation in the communication process, such as user identity,
network location, etc.
Currently, many protocols have tried to implement user
identity anonymity. In 2008, Wang et al presented a commu-
nication protocol (SA-MAC) based on unconditional secure
and efficient source anonymousmessage authentication code,
which can hide the identity of both senders and receivers
[16]. while the authentication overload of this protocol is
relatively high. Furthermore, it only focuses on the authenti-
cation process of the message, and the link structure is mainly
ring-shaped, and the protocol lacks flexibility. In 2012, Chen
et al presented an effective anonymous communication pro-
tocol (EAC) for wireless networks, which guarantees the
anonymity of the protocol from three angles, and the scheme
only uses a hash function and symmetry encryption with
less computational overhead [17]. In 2014, Ardagna et al
presented a solution that allows smartphone users to imple-
ment an end-to-end anonymous communication protocol in
a mobile cloud computing environment, which solves the
mobile privacy problem generated inmobile cloud computing
scenarios [18]. In 2015, Lo et al presented a new anonymous
secure communication routing protocol (HASR. HASR can
implement anonymous communication in Mobile Ad hoc
network (MANET) environment [19]. Routing efficiency is
improved by omitting a separate anonymous communication
link establishment process, but messages security is difficult
to guarantee.
Onion routing is also the most commonly used method in
current anonymous communication networks [20]. In 2004,
Dingledine et al introduced the second generation of onion
router Tor, which added a directory server to achieve forward
secrecy and protect the user’s location privacy through relay
node sets [21], [22]. In the protocol proposed by Camenisch
in 2005, each node only knows its previous node and the
posterior node on the anonymous communication path, but
the anonymity of this protocol is not acquired [23]. In 2007,
Aaron presented an IO-automata model of an onion rout-
ing protocol, describing the case of guaranteeing protocol
anonymity and unlinkability [24]. In 2019, Piccialli et al
proposed an anonymous network architecture for on-board
and mobile devices in an onion network based on P2P (Peer-
to-Peer) technology [25], [26]. However, the server in the
solution becomes the system bottleneck and is more vul-
nerable to attacks. The certificateless onion routing protocol
proposed in 2017 greatly improved the computing load of the
relay router and obtained a higher data transmission rate [27],
[28]. However, its packet structure cannot counter the data
tampering attack of the relay routing nodes.
In the next-generation network architecture, not only the
user’s identity privacy and data security but also the commu-
nication efficiency of the system should be assured. This is
a key issue in the anonymous communication network. The
proposed protocol in this paper is implemented to address the
issue.
The main contributions of this paper are as follows.
(1) To avoid users’ personal information leakage from
IoT devices, we propose a certificateless encryption
scheme, and conduct a security analysis under the
assumption of Computational Diffie-Hellman(CDH)
Problem.
(2) To improve the messages forwarding efficiency,
we propose a new anonymous communication packet
encapsulation format, effectively decreasing the num-
ber of unnecessary cryptography operations.
(3) To achieve the identity privacy, an anonymous commu-
nication link establishment method is proposed.
(4) We complete an anonymous protocol, implementing
the privacy, security and efficiency in anonymous com-
munication in cyber-physical-social systems.
II. PRELIMINARY
Definition 1 (Discrete Logarithm Problem (DL Prob-
lem)): Let G be a finite cyclic group with prime order q, and
g is one of its generator. If given g and gamodq, computing
a ∈ Zq is difficult.
Definition 2 (Computational Diffie-Hellman Problem
(CDH Problem)): Let G be a finite cyclic group with prime
order q, and g is one of its generator. If given gumodq
and gvmodq, computing y = guvmodq is computationally
difficult.
Definition 3 (Security Model): Assume that AI and AII
represent type I attacker and type II attacker, respectively.
AI can perform partial private key query, public key query,
private key query, and public key replacement query opera-
tion, but does not know the system master key. AII has the
system master key, which can perform partial private key
query, public key query, private key query as AI but can not
perform public key replacement query.
III. NEW CERTIFICATELESS ENCRYPTION SCHEME
This paper designs a new certificateless encryption
scheme applicable to anonymous communication packet
encapsulation format and anonymous communication link
establishment process as follows.
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A. CERTIFICATELESS ENCRYPTION SCHEME
The certificateless encryption scheme of this paper consists
of the following five sub-algorithms.
Setup: KGC inputs the security parameter l to generate a
cyclic multiplication group G with a prime order q (length
is 2l ) and a generator g. KGC chooses three hash functions
H1 : {0, 1}∗ × G → Zq, H2 : G → {0, 1}∗. KGC
randomly selects sksys
$←− Zq as the system master key,
obtains pksys = gsksysmodq as the system public key. The
system public parameter is param = (q, g,G,H1,H2, pksys).
Themessagem ∈ {0, 1}∗ is plaintext space, and the ciphertext
c ∈ C is ciphertext space.
Partial Private Key Extraction: KGC generates a partial
private key for the user after verifying that the identity
of the user ID is legal. KGC randomly selects kID
$←−
Zq and calculates sDID = gkIDmodq. Let rDID = kID +
sksys · H1(ID, sDID )modq, gets a partial private dID =
(sDID , rDID ), KGC sends it to the user ID through the secure
channel.
Set Public-Private Keys: After receiving the dID =
(sDID , rDID ) fromKGC , the user runs this key generation algo-
rithm to generate his own public-private key pair. He picks a
random value tID
$←− Zq and computes uID = gtIDmodq.
Then, the public key of the user is pkID = (sDID , uID), and the
private key is skID = (rDID , tID). The user transmits his public
key to the KGC through a secure channel and KGC publishes
it in the public information list. The user keeps the private key
skID = (rDID , tID) secret.
Encryption: The user wishes to encrypt the information m.
Firstly, he randomly chooses ωID
$←− Zq, calculates W =
gωIDmodq. The user encrypts the information and calculates




, c2 = uωIDID modq, c3 = H2(c1 ·
c2) ⊕ m mod q by using the public key of the recipient, and
transmits the ciphertext c = (W , c3) to the recipient.
Decryption: The recipient decrypts the ciphertext c =
(W , c3) with his private key, calculates c1 = W rDID , c2 =
W tID and obtains the message plaintext m = c3⊕H2(c1 · c2).
B. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
Correctness
The correctness of the certificateless encryption scheme
can be proved by the following equation. Using the sender’s
public key pkID = (sDID , uDID ), the original message plaintext
m can be obtained.
c3 ⊕ H2(c1 · c2)
= c3 ⊕ H2(W rDID ·W tID )
= c3 ⊕ H2((gωID )kID+sksysH1(ID,sDID ) · (gωID )tID )
= c3 ⊕ H2((sDID · pk
H1(ID,sDID )
sys ) · uωIDID )
= m (1)
Security proof
It is assumed that Type I attacker AI and Type II attacker
AII can break the encryption scheme of this section. The game
plays between Challenger C and AI or AII until C derives
the solution to the CDH problem based on the interaction
results, breaking the security assumption of the CDH prob-
lem. According to the security proof requirements shown in
references [13], [19], attackers AI and AII can adaptively
perform various queries such as random oracle query, partial
private key extraction, public key request, private key extrac-
tion, and decryption query. C will respond to these queries
according to the distribution of responses in real attacks.
For the attacker AI , C sets gumodq as part of the challenge
ciphertext and gvmodq as the system public key. For the
attacker AII ,C sets gumodq as part of the challenge ciphertext
and uses gvmodq to generate the public key associated with
the challenge identity ID.
The challenger C selects the system master key sksys ∈ Zq,
calculates the system public key pksys = gsksysmodq, and C
sends the system key sksys to AII .
Theorem 1: Under the security assumption of the CDH
problem, if H1 and H2 are random oracles, the certificateless
encryption scheme of this paper has type I security.
Proof: Suppose there is a type I attacker AI can break
the encryption scheme of this paper with a non-negligible
probability ε within Probabilistic Polynomial Time (PPT),
we prove that using the ability ofAI ,C can construct amethod
to solve the CDH problem. From the security assumptions
of the CDH problem, it is impossible for AI to break this
scheme.
Assume that AI raise queries to random oracles in finite
polynomial time. In the following steps, we demonstrate that
using AI , Challenger C successfully constructs a solution to
the CDH problem.
Setup
The challenger C sets pksys = gvmodq and passes the
system parameters params = (q, g,G,H1,H2, pksys) to AI ,
where H1, H2 are random oracles controlled by C .
Phase 1
AI performs the following oracle queries, Challenger C
responds to the queries from AI .
H1 Query: For a given (ID,sDID ), Challenger C prepares a
hash list LH1 to record all H1 hash queries and responds as
follows, where the hash list is empty at the beginning.
If 〈(ID, sDID ), α〉 exists in LH1 , C returns α as the answer.
Otherwise, randomly selects α
$←− Zq, adds
〈(ID, sDID ), α〉 to LH1 and returns α as the answer.
H2 Query: For a given (c1·c2) query, ChallengerC prepares
a hash list LH2 to record all H2 hash queries and responds as
follows, where the hash list is empty at the beginning.
If 〈(c1 · c2), k〉 exists in LH2 , C returns k as the answer.
Otherwise, randomly selects k
$←− {0, 1}l , adds 〈(c1 ·
c2), k〉 to LH2 and returns k as the answer.
Partial Private Key Query: For a given ID, Challenger C
responds to partial private key queries as follows.
If the 〈ID, (sDID , rDID )〉 exists in the list Lpar , C returns
dID = (sDID , rDID ) as the answer.
Otherwise, C proceeds as follows.
62662 VOLUME 8, 2020
F. Li et al.: Privacy-Aware Secure Anonymous Communication Protocol in CPSS Cloud Computing
By randomly selects rDID
$←− Zq, C calculates
sDID = grDID g−αmodq. Adds 〈(ID, sDID ), α〉 to LH1 and add〈ID, (sDID , rDID )〉 to Lpar . Returns dID = (sDID , rDID ) as the
answer.
Public Key Request Query: For a given ID, Challenger C
responds to the public key request query as follows.
If the 〈ID, (sDID , uDID ), coin〉 exists in Lpub, C returns
pkID = (sDID , uDID ) as the answer.
Otherwise, C selects coin ∈ {0, 1} such that Pr[coin =
0] = δ.
coin ∈ {0, 1} is a guess as to whether ID is the challenge
identity chosen by the attacker during the challenge phase.
coin = 0means that ID is not a challenging identity. coin = 1
represents that ID is the challenging identity.
When coin = 0, C does as follows.
If the 〈ID, (sDID , rDID )〉 exists in the list Lpar , C randomly
selects tID
$←− Zq, calculates uID = gtIDmodq, adds
〈ID, (rDID , tID)〉 to the list Lpriv, adds 〈ID, (sDID , uID), coin〉
to the list Lpub, and returns pkID = (sDID , uID) as the answer.
When coin = 1, C does as follows. randomly selects
kID, tID
$←− Zq, calculates sDID = gkIDmodq, uID =
gtIDmodq, adds 〈ID, (tID∗ ), kID〉 to Lpub, adds 〈ID, (tID∗ ), kID〉
to Lpriv, adds 〈ID, (sDID , kID)〉 to Lpar , and gives pkID =
(sDID , uID) as a response.
Private Key Extraction Query: For a given ID, challenger
C responds to the private key extraction query as follows.
C Runs the above public key query algorithm with ID as
input to get 〈ID, (sDID , uID), coin〉 ∈ Lpub.
When coin = 0, C finds 〈ID, (rDID , tID)〉 in Lpriv and
returns skID = (sDID , rDID ) as the answer. Otherwise, C
returns ‘‘abort’’ and the algorithm ends. In this case,C cannot
calculate rDID .
Public Key Replacement Query: AI sets pkID =
(sDID
′, uID′). To respond a public key replacement,
C finds the 〈ID, (sDID , uID), coin〉 in Lpub, replaces
(sDID , uID) with (sDID
′, uID′), and marks the tuple as
‘‘updated’’.
Decryption Query: For a given ciphertext c = (W , c3),
Challenger C responds to the decryption query in the follow-
ing manner.
C finds 〈ID, (sDID , uID), coin〉 in Lpub . If it does
not exist, C runs the above public key query algorithm
to generate a public key pkID = (sDID , uID) for the
user ID .
If it exists and coin = 0, it is obvious that C knows
the private key skID = (sDID , rDID ) of the corresponding
ciphertext and can calculate the corresponding plaintext m as
follows. Calculates c1 = W rDIDmodq, c2 = W tIDmodq, and
decrypts the plaintext m = c3 ⊕ H2(c1 · c2) as a response to
the decryption query. Otherwise, if it exists and coin = 1 (C
does not know rDID ), C can also calculate the plaintext as
follows.
C first calculates c2 = W tIDmodq, runs the H1 query
to get the 〈(ID, sDID ), α〉, and then calculates uωIDID · (sDID ·
pkαsys)
ωIDmodq = c1 · c2.
If the challenger C gets 〈(c1 · c2, k)〉 in the LH2 , so that c =
k⊕m, c1 ·c2 = uωIDID ·(sDID ·pkαsys)ωIDmodq = c1 ·c2, thenC can
calculate the laintextm = c3⊕k and returns it to the attacker.
And then C calculates cˆ1 = (c1/W k∗ID )α−1 = guvmodq as the
solution to the CDH problem.
Otherwise, C returns ‘‘reject’’ and the algorithm stops.
Challenge
Suppose that attacker AI sends an identity ID∗,
two plaintexts (m0,m1)to challenger C . Suppose that
<ID∗,(ρ,uID∗ ),coin> is the public key of ID∗ in Lpub, and the
<ID,(sDID∗ ,rDID∗> is his partial private key in Lpar .
If coin = 0, the output is ‘‘abort’’ and the algorithm stops.
Otherwise, if coin = 1, since the public key may be
replaced by an attacker, AI sets the value ρ = gkID∗ =
gλmodq as the public part of the private key of ID∗. C finds
<ID,(tID∗ ,rDID∗> in Lpriv and selects a random value b{0, 1}.
At this point, C calculates α∗ = H1(ID∗, sDID∗ ),w∗ =
gumodq, c1 = W ∗rDID∗ = W ∗(λ+ν·α)modq, c2 =
W ∗tID∗modq, and then generates the challenge ciphertext
(W ∗, c∗3)and sends it to AI . Where H2((sDID∗ gν·α)u · uID∗u)
and rDID∗ are the private keys of challenging identity, but
Challenger C does not know rDID∗ .
Phase 2
At this step, Challenger C can continue to respond various
query operations according to the previous challenge results,
but does not allow AI to perform a private key query for the
challenging identity ID∗.
Guess
Based on the previous challenges and query results,AI
outputs a guess for b. If an attacker AI can decrypt challenge
(W ∗, c∗3) to get the correct plaintext message m0 or m1, then
it must have done H2 query to get k . Therefore, C can find
(c1 · c2) and the corresponding k in LH2 , then AI can output
the guess b.
Analysis
If the attacker AI makes H2 query but does not perform
the decryption query (sDID∗ · gb·α)a · uID∗a and the private
key query of the challenging identity ID∗, the challenger C
does not abort the response during the game, and AI can get
the true plaintext m0 or m1 of the corresponding challenging
ciphertext (W ∗, c∗3), which means that attackerAI calculates
the true value of c1 = g((λ+ν·α)·u).
Suppose that the advantage of AI breaks this encryption
scheme type I security is ε. As long as C does not abort,
ChallengerC can use the ability ofAI to calculate the solution
cˆ1 = (c1/W k∗ID )α−1 = guν of the CDH problem. Therefore,
the probability that Challenger C does not abort is the prob-
ability of C to successfully break the security assumption of
CDH.
Assume that the number of times that AI does private key
query is qpriv. The condition of that C does not stop during
the challenging phase is coin = 1, the happening probability
of which is (1− δ). In addition, the condition of abort during
the private key extraction query phase is coin = 0, the hap-
pening probability of which is δ. Because the number of
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private key queries is qpriv, the probability that the simulation
algorithm does not stop during the entire private key extrac-
tion query phase is δqpriv . Therefore, the probability that the
whole simulation process will not stop is(1− δ)δqpriv . That is,
if AI can break the encryption scheme with a non-negligible
probability ε within PPT, the probability that challenger C
successfully breaks the CDH problem is ε(1− δ)δqpriv , which
is non-negligible.
According to the security assumption of the CDH problem,
the certificateless encryption scheme proposed in this paper
has type I security.
Theorem 2: Under the security assumption of the CDH
problem, if H1 and H2 are random oracles, then the certifi-
cateless encryption scheme of this paper has type II security.
Proof: Suppose there is an attacker AII who breaks the
encryption mechanism of this paper with probability ε in
the polynomial time. In the following steps, we prove that
by using the ability of AII , C can obtain the solution of
the CDH problem with a non-negligible probability. That
is, by simulating a type II security game, for a given input
params = (q,G, g, gu, gν), C can obtain V = guv as a
solution to the CDH problem.
Setup
ChallengerC randomly selects sksys
$←− Zq and calculates
the public key pksys = gsksysmodq. C generates the public
parameter params = (q, g,G, pksys,H1,H2) and sends it to
AII . C sends the master key sksys to AII through a secure
channel.
Phase 1
AII performs the following random query, which is
responded by the challenger C .
H1 Query:For a given input(ID,sDID ), Challenger C
responds to the H1 query as follows.
If <(ID,sDID ),α> exists in LH1 , C returns α as the answer.
Otherwise, C randomly selects α
$←− Zq, and adds
<(ID,sDID ),α> to LH1 and returns α as the answer.
H2 Query: For a given input(c1, c2), ChallengerC responds
to the H2 query as follows.
If<(c1 · c2),k> exists in LH2 , C returns k as the answer.
Otherwise, C randomly selects k
$←− {0, 1}l and adds
〈(c1 · c2, k)〉 to LH2 and returns k as the answer.
Partial Private Key Query: For a given input ID, Chal-
lenger C responds to partial private key queries as follows.
If 〈ID, (sDID , rDID )〉 exists in the list Lpar , C returns dID =
(sDID , rDID ) as the answer. Otherwise, C proceeds as follows.
Using the system key sksys, C generates a partial private
key for the user ID as follows .
C selects kID
$←− Zq randomly and computes sDID =
gkIDmodq. C looks up the list LH1 to get the 〈(ID, sDID ), α〉.
Lets rDID = kID + sksys · H1(ID, sDID )modq. Adds
〈ID, (sDID , rDID )〉 to Lpar . At last, C returns (sDID , rDID ) as the
response.
Public Key Request Query: For a given input ID, Chal-
lenger C responds to the public key request query as follows:
If 〈ID, (sDID , uID), coin〉 exists in Lpub, C returns pkID =
(sDID , uID) as the response.
Otherwise, C selects coin ∈ {0, 1} such that Pr[coin =
0] = δ.
If coin = 0, C does the following steps.
If 〈ID, (sDID , rDID )〉 exists in list Lpar (otherwise, C needs
to run the above partial private key query algorithm to get a
partial private key (sDID , rDID ).), C randomly selects tID
$←−
Zq, and calculates uID = gtIDmodq. Adds 〈ID, (tDID , rDID )〉
to Lpriv and adds 〈ID, (sDID , uID), coin〉 to Lpub. At last, C
returns pkID = (sDID , uID) as the response.
If coin = 0, C randomly selects tID $←− Zq, calcu-
lates uID = (gu)tIDmodq. C adds 〈ID, (sDID , uID), coin〉 to
Lpub, adds 〈ID, (∗, rDID ), tID〉 to Lpriv, and returns to pkID =
(sDID , uID) as the response.
Private Key Extraction Query: For a given input ID, Chal-
lenger C responds to the private key extraction query as
follows.
First, C runs the public key query algorithm to get
the public key 〈ID, (sDID , uID), coin〉 ∈ Lpub of the
identity ID.
If coin = 0,C looks up 〈ID, (tID, rDID )〉 in Lpriv and returns
skID = (tID, rDID ) as the response. Otherwise, C returns
‘‘abort’’ and the algorithm stops.
Decryption Query: For a given ciphertext (W , c3), Chal-
lenger C responds the decryption query as
follows.
C looks up 〈ID, (sDID , uID), coin〉 in the Lpub. If it does not
exist,C runs the above public key query algorithm to generate
a public key for the user ID.
If coin = 0, C looks for 〈ID, (tID, rDID )〉 in Lpriv, gets
skID = (tID, rDID ), and then runs the decryption query algo-
rithm to get c1 = W rDID , c2 = W tID , m = c3 ⊕ H3(c1 · c2).
At last, C returns plaintext m as a response.
If coin = 1, C calculates c1 = W rDID , runs the H1 query
to get the 〈(ID, sDID ), α〉 .
If 〈(c1 · c2), k〉 exists in LH1 , C calculates uωIDID =
((gu)tID )ωIDmodq, W = gωID ,c1 · c2 = uωIDID · (sDID · pkαsys)ωID ,
and thenC performs anH2 query. If ChallengerC succeeds in
doing a query in LH2 , and getsH2(c1 ·c2), he returns plaintext
m = c3 ⊕ H2(c1 · c2) as the response.
Otherwise, C returns ‘‘reject’’ and the algorithm stops.
Challenge
The attacker AII chooses a challenge identity ID∗ and two
plaintext messages (m0,m1) and sends them to Challenger C .
C performs a public key query in Lpub to get
〈ID∗, (sDID∗ , uID∗ ), coin〉, and if coin = 1, the algorithm con-
tinues. If coin = 0, the algorithm
stops.
C looks up 〈ID∗, (tID∗ , rDID∗ )〉 in the Lpriv. Selects random
bit b ∈ {0, 1} and decides which plaintext to be encrypted.
Sets W ∗ = gv, α∗ = H2(ID∗, sDID∗ ), where c1 = W ∗rDID∗ ,
c2 = W ∗utID∗ = (gu)tID∗v,c3 = (W ∗rDID∗ ·W ∗utID∗ )⊕mb, and
sends (W ∗, c∗3) as the target ciphertext to the attacker AII .
62664 VOLUME 8, 2020
F. Li et al.: Privacy-Aware Secure Anonymous Communication Protocol in CPSS Cloud Computing
Phase 2
At this step, Challenger C continues to respond the vari-
ous query operations of Phase 1 based on the results of the
previous query, but does not allow AII to make a public key
replacement.
Guess
In the end, AII outputs a guess bit b based on the previous
query and challenge results. If attacker AII can decrypt the
ciphertext to get the corresponding plaintext, then he must
have performed H2 query.
Analysis
Suppose attacker AII made an H1 query on the (ID∗, sDID∗ )
but did not do decryption query to (sDID · pkαsys)b · uID∗b,
and there is no private key query and Challenger C did
not stop the algorithm. Suppose attacker AII can break the
encryption scheme of this paper and obtain the plaintext of the
corresponding challenge ciphertext. At this time, Challenger
C can use the ability of the attacker AII to get c
1/tID∗
2 = guv
as a solution to the CDH problem.
In order to analyse the probability that Challenger C suc-
cessfully solves the CDH problem, suppose that the number
of private key queries performed by AII is qpriv, and the
parameters given by type I security proof are used. The
probability that C will not stop (coin = 1) is (1 − δ) during
the challenge phase. The probability that a single private key
extraction query will not stop is δ, and the probability that
the entire private key query phase will not abort is δqpriv ,
so that the probability that the whole simulation process
will not stop is (1 − δ)δqpriv . That is, if AII can break the
encryption scheme with a non-negligible probability ε within
PPT, the probability that challenger C successfully solves the
CDH problem is ε(1− δ)δqpriv , which is non-negligible.
According to the security assumption of the CDH problem,
the encryption scheme of this paper has Type II security.
IV. ANONYMOUS COMMUNICATION PROTOCOL BASED
ON CERTIFICATELESS ENCRYPTION
Onion routing technology plays a vital role in anonymous
communication networks, not only hiding the user’s network
location, but also resisting traffic analysis attacks [29], [30].
Based on the above encryption scheme, this paper proposes
a new packet encapsulation format using the framework of
onion routing protocol, and implements a new anonymous
communication protocol, which can realize fast and secure
anonymous message forwarding.
The anonymous communication protocol is divided into
two parts: anonymous communication link establishment
and anonymous message forwarding. The establishment of
anonymous communication links is mainly to implement the
distribution of shared keys [31]. The shared keys are divided
into two categories, one is for encapsulation of onions to
encrypt and decrypt operations during the establishment of
anonymous communication links, and the other is for the
encryption and decryption operations of anonymous data
packets during message forwarding [32]. Both shared keys
are generated based on the certificateless cryptosystem using
the DH key exchange.
A. ANONYMOUS COMMUNICATION LINK
ESTABLISHMENT
When a user IDA wants to establish an anonymous com-
munication link with a destination D, KGC firstly selects L
(this protocol takes L = 3 as an example) onion routing
nodes in the public list, and obtains the long-term public key
pki(i = 1, 2, 3) for the relay nodes and long-term public key
pkD for the destination node D.
A user IDA uses his own private key to generate temporary
public-private key pairs (XD,YD) and (Xi,Yi)(i = 1, 2, 3),
respectively with the destination node D of the link and the
three routing nodes Ri(i = 1, 2, 3) when establishing the link.
Based on these temporary public-private key pairs, the user
IDA uses the DH key exchange algorithm to generate shared
session keys KD and Ki(i = 1, 2, 3) with destination node D
and three routing nodes Ri(i = 1, 2, 3), respectively.
User IDA firstly generates a link establishment request
REQ, encrypts it using the shared key KD. And then IDA uses
the shared key Ki(i = 1, 2, 3) encrypt the anonymous link
setup request layer by layer to obtain a three-layer onion link
setup packet.
The encrypted content includes next-hop router, session
deadline, and onion encrypted packets that needs to be for-
warded to the next-hop router.
Moreover, IDA distributes the temporary key YD and Yi(i =
1, 2, 3) selected by itself to the destination node D and each
onion routing node Ri(i = 1, 2, 3), using the long-term public
key pki of the node Ri.
The three-layer onion packet structure is shown as follows.
{{{{(REQ,−,EXP,−)KD , (YD)pkD ,EXP,RD}K3 ,
(Y3)pk3 ,EXP,R3}K2 , (Y2)pk2 ,EXP,R2}K1 , (Y1)pk1} (2)
A user IDA sends the three-layer onion to the first routing
node R1 of the anonymous link. R1 decrypts the public key
of the onion packet by using its long-term private key ski and
gets the temporary public key Y1. The decryption operation
of the onion packet is performed in two steps:
(1) Using the DH algorithm, calculate the shared session
key K1 from the sender IDA based on the temporary
public key Y1 : K1 = (Y1)sk1 .
(2) Decrypt the first layer of onion using the shared session
key K1, get the next-hop routing node R2, the session
expiration time EXP, and the two-layer onion packet
that needs to be forwarded to R2.
{{{(REQ,−,EXP,−)KD , (YD)pkD ,EXP,RD}K3 ,
(Y3)pk3 ,EXP,R3}K2 , (Y2)pk2} (3)
R1 first checks the validity of the session time. If the
deadline is not exceeded,R1 forwards the decrypted two-layer
onion encrypted data packet to routing node R2.
After having received the two-layer encrypted onion
packet, the routing node R2 performs the same operation as
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the routing node R1. He decrypts the temporary public key
Y2 with its private key, and calculates the shared session key
K2. R2 uses K2 to decrypt the second layer of the onion to
collet the next hop routing node R3, the session expiration
time EXP, and one-layer of onion encrypted packet that needs
to be forwarded to R3 as follows.
{{(REQ,−,EXP,−)KD , (YD)pkD ,EXP,RD}K3 , (Y3)pk3} (4)
R2 forwards the decrypted one-layer onion encrypted data
packet to routing node R3.
Routing node R3 performs the same operation as routing
node R2, obtains the inner onion encrypted packet as follows.
And R3 forwards it to the destination RD of the anonymous
link.
(REQ,−,EXP,−)KD , (YD)pkD (5)
The destination D receives the inner onion and decrypts
(YD)pkD with its private key skD to obtain the temporary public
key YD. The temporary public key YD and its own long-term
private key skD are used to generate the shared key KD and
D decrypts (REQ,−,EXP,−)KD to get an anonymous link
establishment request REQ and session expiration time. After
decryption, it is found that the packet has no next-hop router,
and it confirms D that it is the ultimate receiver of the packet,
and it can start analysing the link establishment request REQ
.
If D agrees to the link establishment request, by inter-
acting with KGC , based on the certificateless cryptosystem,
it generates a pair of session temporary public-private key
pair (X ′D,Y ′D). The subsequent session applies the DH key
exchange algorithm to generating a session key K ′D, where
K ′D = (YD)X
′
D for the subsequent data transmission phase
between the source IDA and the destinationD. ThenD gener-
ates the acknowledgment informationACK of the anonymous
link establishment. D uses the KD to encrypt its own session
temporary public key Y ′D and acknowledgement information,
and returns it to its previous node R3 according to the previ-
ously reserved routing information.
When the onion routing node Ri(i = 1, 2, 3) receives the
confirmation message, it generates a pair of session tempo-
rary public-private key pair (X ′i ,Y ′i )(i = 1, 2, 3) in the same
way.
The onion routing node Ri(i = 1, 2, 3) can generate the
shared session key K ′i , where K ′i = (Yi)X
′
i (i = 1, 2, 3) with
the temporary public key Yi of IDA. In the later session phase,
the onion routing node Ri(i = 1, 2, 3) can use this session
key K ′i (i = 1, 2, 3) to perform encryption and decryption
operations on the onion packet.
D and onion router Ri(i = 1, 2, 3) encrypt acknowledge-
ment message ACK layer-by-layer using KD, Ki(i = 1, 2, 3)
and return the onion packet to the previous-hop node in turn
as follows:
{{{(ACK ,Y ′D)KD ,Y ′3}K3 ,Y ′2}K2 ,Y ′1}K1 (6)
After having received the confirmation onion packet,
the user IDA decrypts the onion packet layer by layer using the
TABLE 1. Anonymous message packet format.
shared key Ki(i = 1, 2, 3) and KD to obtain the confirmation
message of the destination D and the temporary public key
Y ′i (i = 1, 2, 3) and Y ′D . IDA can calculate the session keys
K ′i (i = 1, 2, 3) and K ′D of the routing nodes Ri(i = 1, 2, 3)
and D in the anonymous data transmission phase based on
the DH key exchange algorithm.
K ′D = (Y ′D)XD (7)
K ′i = (Y ′i )Xi (i = 1, 2, 3) (8)
At this point, the anonymous link establishment process
ends.
B. ANONYMOUS MESSAGE FORWARDING
If the link is successfully established, anonymous data trans-
mission can be performed between users. The user IDA selects
the anonymous message m to be sent, and uses the session
key K ′i (i = 1, 2, 3) generated during the link establishment
phase to sequentially encrypt and generate onion routing
packets, and forward messages along with the anonymous
communication link.
In order to improve the transmission efficiency, this paper
strips the anonymousmessage from the onion packet and only
encrypts the message m with the session key K ′D, and designs
a new packet format (as shown in TABLE 1). It greatly
reduces the number of encryption and decryption operations
of anonymous messages, improving the efficiency of anony-
mous message forwarding.
Therefore, in order to prevent the data packet from being
illegally falsified during the message transmission process,
this paper uses the special signature method to ensure the
integrity of the anonymous message. If the message is
changed, the signature verification fails and the message is
discarded.
The user IDA and the three onion routers sequentially
encrypt the next hop routing information R and the session
expiration time EXP on the anonymous path using the session
keys K ′D and K ′i (i = 1, 2, 3), respectively, to form an onion
routing packet structure for anonymous message forwarding.
The valid anonymous message m uses K ′D to encrypt just
one layer, and then performs subsequent signature operation,
which is appended to the onion routing packet.
After the user IDA has obtained the signature key sk , he
uses it to sign the packet and send it to the first node of the
link.
After having received the data packet, the onion routing
node Ri(i = 1, 2, 3) uses the shared session key K ′i (i =
1, 2, 3) to decrypt the corresponding onion layer, obtains the
next hop routing information, and forwards the inner layer
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onion to the next hop. All onion routing nodes undertake
the same procedure until the packet reaches destination D.
D firstly verify the validity of the signature. If the signature
is invalid, the anonymous message is discarded. Otherwise,
the anonymous communication message m of the sender is
obtained by decrypting the innermost onion packet using the
session key K ′D.
The packet structure in the anonymous message forward-
ing process is as follows:
{{{{(−,EXP,−)K ′D ,EXP,RD}K ′3 ,EXP,R3}K ′2 ,
EXP,R2}K ′1 ||{m}K ′D ||{hash(m)}Sign} (9)
Conversely, if the destination D wants to communicate
anonymously with the user IDA, suppose the anonymous
message is m′, the onion packet is forwarded in the reverse
direction of the anonymous communication path. Destination
D first encrypts the anonymous message and the expiration
time EXP with K ′D, and feeds back to the previous-hop router
on the anonymous path. The previous-hop router continues to
encrypt the packet with the session key along the anonymous
path. Until the anonymous message is fed back to the source
user IDA, IDA uses the session keys K ′i (i = 1, 2, 3) and K ′D
to decrypt the onion in turn to get the anonymous messagem′
sent by D. The corresponding packet format is as follows.
{{{(m′, {hash(m′)}Sign,EXP)K ′D ,EXP}K ′3 ,EXP}K ′2 ,EXP}K ′1
(10)
The anonymousmessage forwarding process betweenUser
IDA and Destination D completes.
C. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
1) SECURITY ANALYSIS
Theorem 3: If the encryption algorithm is provably secure,
the new anonymous communication protocol is secure.
Proof: If attacker A can break the security of the proto-
col in this paper, then we can build an algorithm, in which
Challenger C can use A′s ability to solve the CDH problem.
Suppose that C is the challenger of certificateless encryp-
tion. C runs Setup(1l) → (params, sksys) and calculates
(pkG, skG), sends params and (pkG, skG) to A. If A issues
a key extraction query on the ID∗, then C computes DID∗
and returns DID∗ to A . A sends ID∗, (m0,m1) and signing
key sk∗ to C . C calculates ciphertext c∗ on m0 or m1, uses
sk∗ to calculate the corresponding signature σ , and sends
(ID∗, σ, c∗) to A. If A issues a key extraction query on ID =
ID∗, C returns DID to A. Finally, A outputs b′ ∈ (0, 1),
which can break the security of the certificateless encryption
protocol. This contradicts to the security of the proved certifi-
cateless encryption protocol.
2) EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS
In order to analyze the anonymous communication protocol
in this paper, the efficiency of the protocol is discussed in this
section. The efficiency achieved by the specific parameters is
compared with other current protocols. We analyze the cost
TABLE 2. Efficiency analysis.
of establishing a link of length n from the perspective of the
source user and the onion routing nodes.
A comparison of the protocol in this paper with other
protocols [27], [33] is shown in the following TABLE 2.
As can be seen in TABLE 2, the protocol of this paper is
basically the same as the other two protocols except for the
modulus exponentiation. But in our protocol, the value sID ·
pkH2(ID,sID)sys of each onion routing node can be pre-calculated
to spare the computing overhead. In addition, since the key
of KGC does not change, the pre-calculated value does not
need to be changed repeatedly. The user has to calculate three
exponentiations for each onion routing node. Since uID will
frequently change in value uωIDID , it cannot be pre-calculated.
On the other hand, each onion routing node performs three
exponentiations to obtain the session key.
The key point is that the proposed anonymous commu-
nication protocol does not require KGC to make frequent
changes to the system key. The user only needs to obtain
the key of KGC once, which also holds when the onion
routing node requests its private key. For KGC , it does not
require repeatedly running the key generation phase and has
a lower computational load. At the same time, the use of a
certificateless mechanism can avoid unnecessary scalability
and complex key escrow issues, as well as management ver-
ification of user certificates. Compared with other protocols,
it not only implements security in the encryption process, but
also detects whether the data has been modified. The protocol
can still achieve better efficiency.
V. CONCLUSION
To ensure the end-to-end user data confidentiality, integrity
and identity privacy in CPSS [34], we respectively propose a
certificateless encryption scheme, an anonymous communi-
cation packet encapsulation format, and an anonymous com-
munication link establishment method. And at last we com-
plete an anonymous protocol in CPSS. Performance analysis
shows that the anonymous communication protocol of this
paper has the identity anonymity, the messages confidential-
ity and messages integrity features. However, the proposed
protocol in this paper just uses three relay nodes in the anony-
mous communication link. How to increase the number of
relay nodes in anonymous communication link to strengthen
the security of anonymous communication in CPSS is our key
points in the future work.
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